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ABSTRACT In this paper we examine the inﬂuence of strategic technology alliances on
organisational learning. From an empirical perspective we examine the pre- and post-alliance
knowledge bases of allying ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that the pre-alliance knowledge base overlap of the
allying ﬁrms has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the degree of learning taking place in
the alliance. Alliances established for the purpose of learning also show a signiﬁcantly greater
increase in knowledge base overlap for the allying ﬁrms than for non-learning alliance
or non-allying ﬁrms. This shows the particular importance of learning alliances as a vehicle for
organisational learning and competence development. Contrary to what we expected we found
that weak ties are more important than strong ties in organisational learning within strategic
alliances.
Introduction
The resources or capabilities of a ﬁrm are often seen as an important contributant to overall
company success and competitiveness.
1 In the ‘traditional’ resource-based view of the
ﬁrm, ﬁrms are viewed as a collection of distinctive and difﬁcult to imitate, scarce resources
or capabilities.
2 The deployment of these valuable, rare and idiosyncratic resources
is expected to yield a distinct return or rent for the ﬁrm possessing them. Firm resources
are thus, necessarily, seen as being heterogeneous across ﬁrms. This ‘traditional’ resource-
based perspective sees a ﬁrm’s bundle of resources as static and more or less ﬁxed over
time. Under conditions of change core competencies can then turn into ‘core rigidities’.
3
Whereas the ‘traditional’ resource-based view is mainly concerned with static compe-
tences, the dynamic capabilities view of the ﬁrm, concentrates on dynamic factors (inno-
vation, organisational learning, etc.). Not the deployment of existing resources is at the
focal point of this theory, but rather the change in a ﬁrm’s resources.
4 This change in
resources is necessary for ﬁrms in order to be able to respond effectively to changing
environmental conditions. One of the dynamic capabilities view’s main focus points is
the acquisition of new capabilities through organisational learning.
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important vehicle for competence development.
5 Following Cohen and Levinthal,
6 we see
that two characteristics of the innovation process are very important: the creation of new
knowledge within the ﬁrm itself, and the incorporation of existing external knowledge. On
this junction of internal and external knowledge accumulation one often ﬁnds strategic
technology alliances. Here the internal knowledge inherent to the company is combined
with knowledge external to the company.
7 Both the resource-based view and the
dynamic capabilities view help us to explain organisational learning within strategic
alliances. However, both are unable to explain some of the key issues related to learning
alliances. Therefore we turn to a third stream of literature, the knowledge-based view of
the ﬁrm. In the knowledge-based view of the ﬁrm knowledge is considered the pivotal
resource of a ﬁrm.
8 Knowledge can consist of codiﬁed knowledge contained in the
patents or copyrights of a ﬁrm, but can also be incorporated in the tacit everyday
routine operations carried out by workers. In line with the dynamic capability perspective
this view also concentrates on the dynamics of the ﬁrm resources, rather than on its static
posture. An important point of the knowledge-based view is that it provides a new expla-
nation for the observed trend towards collaborative agreements between ﬁrms. It has been
shown that ﬁrms collaborate, among other things, to get access to the knowledge of other
ﬁrms.
9 According to a recent Accenture study learning was cited as a critical goal in over
40% of all alliances under study.
10 This percentage was expected to exceed 50% in 2003.
As a result the use of collaborations is seen as an important vehicle for organisational
learning and knowledge acquisition, and thus for the creation of new competencies.
Given the increasing importance of external knowledge appropriation by means of stra-
tegic alliances, it is of eminent importance to understand the particular nature of strategic
technology partnering and to take a closer look at the impact of ﬁrm collaborations on
organisational learning. In the rest of this paper we will therefore explore the inﬂuence
of strategic technology alliances on organisational learning.
Theory and Hypotheses
Whereas the ‘traditional’ resource-based view concentrates primarily on the efﬁcient use
of internal competencies, the dynamic capabilities view of the ﬁrm argues that it is of vital
importance to exploit external sources of capabilities. The knowledge-based view incor-
porates both perspectives and deals with the role of knowledge acquisition and integration
within an organisational learning setting.
Firm speciﬁc capabilities are often difﬁcult to create or imitate by other companies.
Some capabilities are protected by patent law, while others are so idiosyncratic that
taken out of their context they are hard to understand. Time constraints can hinder
ﬁrms to create or imitate capabilities fast enough to be able to exploit them. Even ﬁrms
possessing ﬁrm speciﬁc capabilities may not be able to use them effectively in other situ-
ations or other markets.
11 Also the market for capabilities is not perfect, making it difﬁcult
to obtain the resources externally.
12 The external acquisition of knowledge via a merger or
acquisition is also complicated. Whereas mergers and acquisitions (M&As) can provide
scale economies to organisations they hamper ﬂexibility, efﬁcient knowledge transfer
and speed, the capabilities needed most in today’s economy. As in the case of strategic
alliances, recent studies have shown that, in spite of the unprecedented increase in the
number of M&As, their overall contribution to ﬁrms’ performance is very poor. Their
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acquisition in combination with the high acquisition premiums. Companies often get more
than they want and need to sell parts of the acquired ﬁrm again. It might also be very
difﬁcult to use the acquired competences in the acquiring ﬁrm.
13 The most signiﬁcant
problem however, seems to be that the high costs associated with the merger or acquisition
and the correspondingly high exit costs diminish the ﬂexibility of ﬁrms to quickly adapt to
turbulent changes in the economy. Strategic alliances suffer less from these problems, for
they allow greater ﬂexibility and they are less involving than for instance an acquisition.
A ﬁrm can also be involved in several alliances at a time, something that is more difﬁcult
with M&As.
Learning within strategic alliances is however a complex phenomenon
14 and, of course,
also has its problems and shortcomings. We will touch on the most obvious ones here.
Firms must critically evaluate their partner’s knowledge and the relevance of this
knowledge for their own operations.
15 They should make sure that the partnering ﬁrm
really has the desired knowledge and that it is possible to get access to the knowledge
via the proposed alliance. Partners in an alliance must also be willing to actively exchange
knowledge and be able to understand what they are learning.
16 Therefore this also implies
a capacity to learn and the appropriate processes and systems to facilitate learning.
17
Experience with earlier alliances can be helpful in successfully learning from later
alliances
18 and experience with domestic alliances can be a stepping-stone to international
alliances.
19 The management of international alliances is of course more difﬁcult than that
of domestic alliances. A last important point is the alignment of parent and alliance
managers’ culture, thereby avoiding that parent managers see the alliance as a threat and
try to frustrate the alliance’s success.
20 The largest problem in alliance learning is the loss
ofknowledgetothealliancepartnerandtheaccompanyingthreatofopportunisticbehaviour
by the partner. Trust is therefore a very important prerequisite for a successful alliance.
21
Given these shortcomings strategic alliances are nevertheless frequently considered an
effective means of accelerating the accretion of new capabilities. Via inter-organisational
learning, alliance partners can acquire resources or transfer knowledge. More in particular,
alliances can play a major role in the efﬁcient transfer of tacit knowledge. Whereas codi-
ﬁed knowledge can be absorbed by studying, e.g. a blueprint or recipe, without personal
interaction, in the case of tacit knowledge interpersonal contact is very important.
22
Strategic technology alliances are therefore increasingly used for organisational learn-
ing and knowledge transfer.
23 Such organisational learning can take on many different
forms. We can distinguish among three main forms of organisational learning within stra-
tegic alliances.
24 First, ﬁrms make use of alliances to learn how to handle and manage
future alliances. This type of learning primarily affects the managerial processes in the
parent company. In this speciﬁc case no product or process knowledge is transferred.
Second, knowledge might also be transferred merely for use in the present alliance
operations. In this case no attempt is made to internalise the knowledge in the parent oper-
ations, nor was this the intent from the beginning. All the knowledge stays within the
alliance itself. The third form of learning takes place when parent companies transfer
the alliance knowledge to their own operations. Learning is primarily directed towards
helping the parent companies to enhancing their own strategy and business operations.
These three forms of learning obviously do not exclude each other. There might be
combinations of these three forms of learning within alliances. Only when the last form
of learning is included can we call it a learning alliance. So we consider an alliance a
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ferred to the parent ﬁrm, and is used in the parent ﬁrm’s operations.
Various studies have argued that for effective learning processes in alliances, a sufﬁ-
cient degree of absorptive capacity is required. Cohen and Levinthal deﬁne absorptive
capacity as the whole of the abilities of ﬁrms to use their prior related knowledge to
value external information, assimilate it and use it for their own commercial ends.
25
The absorptive capacity of a company is for a large part dependent on the current
degree of knowledge in a speciﬁc technological ﬁeld.
26 Therefore we might argue that
if a ﬁrm lacks a sufﬁciently developed technology base it is likely to have problems
absorbing the newly acquired external technological knowledge. Alliance partners can
only be expected to learn from the alliance as long as they have at least some prior knowl-
edge in a speciﬁc ﬁeld, so that they can incorporate the new knowledge and use it for their
own means. Without an adequate degree of absorptive capacity, a ﬁrm will not be able to
learn. Firms will be better at internalising a partner’s knowledge when they possess at least
some overlap in knowledge bases.
27 Too little overlap in knowledge bases between the
allying ﬁrms is likely to inhibit learning and therefore a minimal level of overlap in knowl-
edge bases is necessary to facilitate learning.
28 However, when there is too much overlap
there will be no learning either, because there is almost nothing the ﬁrms could learn from
each other that they do not already know.
29 We can therefore expect that there is an
optimal level of overlap, which will facilitate the learning the best. Therefore we
hypothesise:
H1: The degree of overlap in the allying partners’ initial knowledge bases has an
inverted U-shaped relationship with the degree of learning taking place in the
alliance.
Although building absorptive capacity and a corresponding internal development of
resources is important, learning from external sources is considered to be equally import-
ant for successful innovation.
30 In particular in turbulent high technology environments in
which a ﬁrm’s competitive position is determined by its ability to innovate, alliances seem
to be the most preferred option. Under conditions of change continued reliance on intern-
ally developed core competences makes ﬁrms extremely vulnerable.
31 Firms are therefore
increasingly engaged in strategic technology alliances. Strategictechnology alliances have
enabled them to cope with the rising costs of R&D efforts and the speed and complexity of
technological developments. An alliance with a competent partner enables ﬁrms to share
development costs and to go faster down the learning curve. This might result in an
improved time-to-market and a corresponding increase in the level of innovativeness.
Because innovation has become one of the key competitive drivers, the use of alliances
might therefore provide a means to achieve sustained competitive advantages. The effec-
tiveness of strategic alliances for organisational learning is demonstrated by a recent
study which showed that the most successful alliance ﬁrms are ﬁve times more likely to
incorporate learning as an explicit goal of their alliances than their non-successful
counterparts.
32
The usefulness of strategic technology alliances for external learning of companies is
tested in several studies.
33 It turns out that strategic technology alliances are a very effec-
tive vehicle for organisational learning. Learning via strategic technology alliances has
many advantages. Alliances often enable ﬁrms to accelerate their capability development
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34 Also the combination of knowledge of the ﬁrms involved in an alliance may
prove to provide important synergistic effects, leading to new and better knowledge that
neither of the partners could have realised independently. Furthermore, a set of alliances
can often be seen as a radar function, which enables ﬁrms to explore new technologies
developed by other companies. If one of these technologies proves to be successful the
ﬁrm may choose to extent the alliance or to integrate the knowledge in-house. This
decreases the risk of loosing out on new interesting technological opportunities and
spreads the costs and risks among partners.
35
Besides establishing alliances for knowledge transfer, ﬁrms also form alliances in order
to exploit their existing resources in new markets. In this case the alliance might not be a
learning alliance, but rather a complementary alliance.
36 In a complementary alliance each
partner brings in its own core competencies. One partner might have the knowledge of the
market whereas the other might have the technical or process knowledge. One can think of
the way in which alliances were established in many developing countries. Most Western
ﬁrms have no knowledge about the local customs in for instance China and thus form an
alliance with a local ﬁrm in which they supply the technical knowledge and the local ﬁrm
supplies the knowledge about the market peculiarities. Although knowledge sharing is
possible, the aim of these kinds of alliances is not to share knowledge, but rather to comp-
lement the partner. The learning that takes place in these kinds of alliances is also more
concerned with the management of the alliance itself and not with the learning of the tech-
nical production knowledge involved in the alliance. Doz and Hamel make the distinction
between learning alliances and co-specialisation alliances, where the former is aimed at
learning from the alliance partner and the latter is primarily directed towards exploiting
new markets.
37 We deﬁne learning alliances as a cooperative agreement formed by two
or more organisations aimed at the sharing of know-how with reciprocal inputs from
all the partners. For this paper we include a number of speciﬁc cooperative forms in
this deﬁnition, i.e. joint development agreements, joint research corporations (JVs),
research consortia, joint R&D pacts as well as mutual technology exchange agreements
(such as mutual second sourcing and cross licensing). Because of the emphasis on learn-
ing, marketing, production and mere single licensing agreements are not included in
our deﬁnition.
The effect of a learning alliance on the relative post-alliance knowledge base overlap of
the allying ﬁrms will be inversely related to the effect of a co-specialisation alliance. A
learning alliance can be expected to provoke an increase in overlap between the allying
ﬁrms, because the intention of the alliance is to learn. For ﬁrms working together in a
co-specialisation alliance, one would expect no increase, or even a decrease in overlap,
because ﬁrms will specialise in different technological ﬁelds and thus resemble each
other less after the alliance. Also for ﬁrms that are not involved in an alliance we
would expect a decrease, or at least no increase, in knowledge base overlap for the measur-
ing period. Therefore the knowledge bases of allying partners in a learning alliance will
show greater increase in overlap than do the knowledge bases of ﬁrms not involved in a
learning alliance, or not involved in an alliance. There might of course be other ways in
which ﬁrms start to resemble each other technologically, for instance by using the same
generally accepted production techniques; shared research trajectories; or commonly
recognised business models. We however expect that the results of a pure learning alliance
on the post alliance knowledge base overlap will be signiﬁcantly greater than for a
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mind that if ﬁrms start to resemble each other more by other mechanisms than only
through the learning via a learning alliance, this would actually strengthen our results if
we ﬁnd that there is indeed a difference between learning alliances on one side and
non-learning alliances or non-allying ﬁrms on the other side.
This leads to our second hypothesis:
H2: Learning alliances will show signiﬁcantly greater learning among the allying
ﬁrms compared to ﬁrms that are not engaged in learning alliances, or not
engaged in alliances at all.
In the social network literature the distinction between strong and weak ties has been
posed to bear important implications on the nature of organisational learning.
38 Weak
ties are considered to be more important for the diffusion of unrelated knowledge
whereas strong ties are more important for the diffusion of related knowledge. According
to Granovetter the strength of a tie is ‘a combination of the amount of time, the emotional
intensity, the intimacy, and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie’.
39 Firms
connected via strong ties know each other well and are also to some degree aware of
the knowledge of the other partner. Firms connected through weak ties are usually less
familiar with each other and with each other’s knowledge base. In weak tie relationships,
ﬁrms can learn from dissimilar knowledge bases whereas in the case of strong ties they can
deepen their understanding of their existing knowledge. Weak ties are therefore more
efﬁcient as drivers of explorative research. They also tend to fulﬁl a bridge function
between two, more or less unrelated business cliques and are therefore geared towards
combining previously distinct knowledge. The lack of ‘social capital’ (trust, comfort) is
however likely to fuel opportunism and a lack of commitment among the alliance partners.
Strong ties, however, are used more often in exploitative research settings where ﬁrms
from the same ‘clique’ or technological ﬁeld work together in order to deepen their exist-
ing knowledge. Therefore, we expect that the scope of the learning in a network comprised
of weak ties is broader and in a network characterised by strong ties is deeper.
The degree of intimacy in the tie is related to the concept of trust.
40 Before ﬁrms are
willing to exchange information or knowledge they want to make sure that their sharing
partner is trustworthy. Firms will be very wary of opportunistic behaviour, especially
when the exchange touches on their core knowledge.
41 According to transaction cost
theory, the type of contact between ﬁrms depends on the anticipated transaction costs.
Especially with core capabilities involved ﬁrms will be very protective, and choose for
a reliable partner. Also the resource-based theory of the ﬁrm considers reputation an
important resource.
42 In combination with strong and weak ties we can expect that
there will be more trust between partners with strong ties, than with partners who are con-
nected via weak ties. As argued by Krackhard these ‘...strong ties constitute a base of
trust that can reduce resistance and provide comfort in the face of uncertainty’.
43
In strong ties, opportunistic behaviour affects the reputation of ﬁrms more than in a situ-
ation of weak ties. If a ﬁrm is considered a non-trustworthy partner in a network of strong
ties this news will travel quickly and its effect on the opportunistic ﬁrm will be consider-
able. In a weak tie situation both problems are less critical and might even be outweighed
by the application of the knowledge gained in the own clique. Although ﬁrms might use
strong and weak ties for different reasons, when learning is involved we can expect ﬁrms
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concerned. For learning which involves their core competencies they will relay on
strong ties.
So while ﬁrms could potentially learn a great deal from weak tie contacts, the fear for
opportunistic behaviour and consequently the lack of trust might inhibit knowledge ﬂows.
Although learning in a strong tie situation will be less broad, we can expect more knowl-
edge ﬂows in these kinds of interactions as a result of greater trust between partners. This
leads us to expect that most of the observed knowledge ﬂows will be between ﬁrms con-
nected via strong ties. We would therefore expect more learning to take place in a strong
tie alliance as opposed to a weak tie alliance.
Therefore our third hypothesis:
H3: The learning, taking place in strong tie alliances is larger than in weak tie
alliances.
Data
Our sample of ﬁrms is taken from the Fortune 500 list in 1997.
44 We selected all ﬁrms in
the medium- to high-tech sectors. This provided us with a set of 171 parent ﬁrms in
12 sectors. Using the Dun & Bradstreet Linkages dataset we searched all the subsidiaries
of these 171 ﬁrms to construct a ‘group’ list per ﬁrm. This ‘group’ list makes it possible to
trace back more of the patents of the multinationals we studied. This enables us to include
the patents and patent citations of their subsidiaries and not just those of only the parent
company. The version of the Dun & Bradstreet Linkages database that we used originates
from 1998 and thus represents the ‘group’ list at that particular moment in time, or actually
a bit earlier. Of course, the parent–subsidiary relationships will change over time, so
we want our measuring moment to be as close as possible to the moment of the sample
construction.
For the data on patents we made use of the European Patent Ofﬁce (EPO) data set. Based
on the ‘group’ lists that we constructed, we searched the EPO data set for all patents of the
multinational. In the EPO database the patents are recorded by applicant name. Sometimes
we found names that only partly corresponded with the names of the ﬁrms we were
looking for, in which case we compared the address obtained from Dun & Bradstreet
with the address contained in the EPO database. If they were identical we included the
patents in our sample, otherwise we excluded them. We also used the patent citation
data present in EPO so that we could end up with a list of all the patent citations per patent.
We made use of the well-known MERIT-Cooperative Agreements and Technology
Indicators (CATI) database for the information on alliances. The CATI database is a
relational database containing over 15,000 cooperative agreements involving about 9500
ﬁrms. Systematic collection of inter-ﬁrm alliances started in 1987, but earlier years were
searched in retrospect. Different sources were used for the construction of the database,
among the most important are newspapers and trade journal articles. Even though the
dataset will be inevitably incomplete and biases might be present, CATI is likely to be
themostcompleteanddependablesourceavailableoncooperativetechnologyagreements.
We only researched allying ﬁrms and did not include, for instance, information on
learning through an M&A. M&As however turn out to have only limited inﬂuence on
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ing.
45 Our dataset is also constructed for only one year, namely 1998. All the ﬁrms that
belonged to the ‘group’ at that moment are included. The patents are thus only included
for the subsidiaries that the parent ﬁrm had in 1998. M&A activity, even if it would
have had an inﬂuence on the ﬁrms in our dataset, is thus not inﬂuencing our results.
Only the subsidiaries of 1998 are taken into account, regardless whether these ﬁrms
were sold later on or whether other ﬁrms were taken over and became part of the
‘group’ after 1998.
For data on R&D expenditures and number of employees we made use of the World-
scope database. The data on R&D expenditures was converted to US dollars to facilitate
comparison.
Methods
The knowledge that a ﬁrm possesses can be thought of as residing in the patents owned
by the ﬁrm. Patents are by deﬁnition representations of new and unique pieces of knowl-
edge, and as such, the collection of patents a ﬁrm has, represents its total set of knowl-
edge. Following Ahuja and Katila,
46 we also include the patents that the ﬁrm is citing in
its own patents, for also the knowledge included in these patents must, to some extent, be
known to the ﬁrm. Even though the ﬁrm itself, just for legal reasons, might include some
of the patent citations, or they might be included by the patent ofﬁcer reviewing the
patent, these citations indicate a knowledge relationship and the ﬁrm can be expected
to have at least some idea of the knowledge involved, especially at the multinational
level. The general knowledge base of a ﬁrm in our sample is then deﬁned as the total
of a ﬁrm’s own patents, plus the patents cited there in. The individual patents in each
ﬁrm’s knowledge base can then be compared with the patents in other ﬁrms’ knowledge
bases.
Patent-based measures of course have their limitations—see for instance Griliches
47.
The propensity to patent for instance might differ per industry. Some industries rely
heavily on patents while others do not and so we therefore include a dummy variable
for alliances between ﬁrms from different industries and alliances between ﬁrms from
the same industries. Furthermore, alliances are especially important for the transfer of
tacit knowledge,
48 but the patents we are using are by deﬁnition examples of codiﬁed
knowledge. This could lead us to exclude the tacit knowledge component from our analy-
sis. The tacit knowledge ﬂowing over ﬁrm boundaries, however, is almost impossible to
measure, but there is substantial evidence that tacit knowledge ﬂows are closely linked
with codiﬁed knowledge ﬂows
49 and thus we feel conﬁdent in the use of patent data.
We started our analysis by extracting alliance pairs from the CATI database for our base
year, 1993, which belong to our set of medium- to high-tech ﬁrms from the Fortune 500
list of 1997. For these alliance pairs we calculated or collected the necessary variables.
We found 78 unique alliance pairs, which we used for our analyses.
We used 1993 as our base year for two reasons. The ﬁrst reason to do this is because the
year 1993 is close to 1998, the year of our database construction. The closer we are to 1998
the more conﬁdent we can be that the results we ﬁnd can be extrapolated to the 1998
conﬁguration of ﬁrms and interconnections. Furthermore taking 1993 as a base year
still gives us enough measuring years to be able to retrieve reliable information from
our data.
252 W. Schoenmakers & G. DuystersDependent Variable
As our dependent variable we took the knowledge base overlap after the alliance was
established (KBOA). The knowledge base overlap is deﬁned as the number of patents
that appear in both ﬁrms’ general knowledge bases, divided by the total number of
patents in both ﬁrms’ general knowledge base. We are thus looking at the relative use
the ﬁrms are making of the allying ﬁrms’ patents—we are not for instance looking at
patenting activity. We measure this overlap for the ﬁve years after the establishment of
the alliance, i.e. from 1994 to 1998. This has to do with the time it takes to obtain a
new patent and the time to undertake subsequent patent citations. So the knowledge
base overlap for a certain alliance between Firmi and Firmj after the alliance is:
KBOAij ¼ (KBAi > KBAj)=(KBAi < KBAj):
Independent Variable
Our independent variable is the knowledge base overlap before the alliance is established
(KBOB). Here we measure the overlap in the ﬁrm’s general knowledge bases in the
ﬁve years before the establishment of the alliance. Again this is a measure of the relative
use of the other ﬁrms’ patents by the focal ﬁrm. The knowledge base overlap for the
alliance between Firmi and Firmj before the alliance is deﬁned as:
KBOBij ¼ (KBBi > KBBj)=(KBBi < KBBj):
We will use KBOBij as well as (KBOBij)
2.
Control Variables
We also included the number of prior alliances of the ﬁrms (PAGij) in general, so with all
other ﬁrms it allied with, and the number of prior alliances ‘special’ thus with the same
other ﬁrm (PASij), as independent variables. For both variables we looked at the alliances
the ﬁrms had since 1970 and for the ﬁve successive years before the alliance, and used the
average of both ﬁrms in the alliance. This provided us with four variables PAGij70,
PASij70, PAGij5, and PASij5. We expect that the number of prior alliances will have a
positive inﬂuence on the learning taking place. Firms that work together more often
will experience more trust within the relationship, so this might increase the learning.
Furthermore, ﬁrms that had more alliances will have more experience in dealing with
an alliance and also this will increase the likelihood of a knowledge transfer.
We expect thus a positive inﬂuence from the number of prior alliances on the learning.
To further test the inﬂuence of strong and weak ties in a relationship we also used the
number of prior equity alliances (PEAs5) with the same other ﬁrm in the ﬁve years before
the alliance as a proxy of the strength of the tie between the two ﬁrms in the alliance. In an
equity alliance the allying ﬁrms have strong commitments to each other, inhibiting oppor-
tunistic behaviour. Non-equity alliances, however, have more characteristics of the looser
relationship of a weak tie. The more equity alliances two ﬁrms have prior to the measuring
alliance of 1993, the stronger we can expect their tie to be. We thus expect a tie to be stron-
ger according to the number of past equity alliances the ﬁrms have had, thus prior to the
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the number of past equity alliances is larger. We also included a dummy variable
(EQUITY), which is represented by a one (1) in case of an equity alliance in 1993 and
a zero (0) for a non-equity alliance between the two ﬁrms in 1993. We included this vari-
able to correct for a possible inﬂuence of the current form of the alliance.
Other control variables that we included are the logarithm of R&D spending of the ﬁrms
inthealliance(R&Dij).IfﬁrmsdedicatealargeramountofspendingtoR&Dtheywillhave
more in-house knowledge to process the new knowledge. Furthermore, these ﬁrms are
likely to have a learning attitude. Further we included the logarithm of the number of
employees(SIZEij)oftheallyingﬁrms.Sizeislikelytohaveapositiveeffectonknowledge
ﬂows. A larger ﬁrm can be expected to have a larger pool of knowledge to draw from, and
will thus be better at incorporating new knowledge. Also larger ﬁrms have more resources
for incorporating the new knowledge. However, smaller ﬁrms are usually considered more
innovativethanlargerﬁrms,whichwouldleadustoexpectlesslearninginbiggerﬁrms.For
both variables, R&Dij and SIZEij, we use the average values of both ﬁrms in the alliance.
We also included a dummy variable for ﬁrms from the same industry allying
(SECTORij). We might expect more learning to take place between ﬁrms from the
same industry, because the knowledge overlap between the ﬁrms will be bigger.
However, because of competition sensitivities ﬁrms might be more reluctant to share
knowledge with ﬁrms from the same industry. We expect the ﬁrst inﬂuence to be more
inﬂuential. This means that it will be represented by a zero (0) if two ﬁrms from different
industries are allying and by a one (1) if they are from the same industry.
To test our hypotheses we test the following empirical speciﬁcation:
KBOAij ¼ f(KBOBij,( K B O Bij)2,P A Sij,P A Gij, PEAsij5, R&Dij,
SIZEij, SECTORij, EQUITYij):
The testing of Hypothesis 2 requires the construction of a control group. To be able to test
if ﬁrms working together in a learning alliance learn more than ﬁrms who are not involved
in such an alliance, or not allying, we needed to construct a control group of ﬁrms who had
not worked together in a learning alliance. For every alliance pair A–B in our dataset we
searched in the CATI-database for a ﬁrm C that did not have an alliance with either A or B
and that resembled B as close as possible, concerning industry, ﬁrm size, R&D spending
and number of patents. The ‘new’ ﬁrm C was than put together with the ‘old’ ﬁrm A. This
‘matched’ pair A–C was used as control group in the testing of hypothesis 2.
Results
Before we can start testing our hypotheses we ﬁrst take a closer look at our data and at its
speciﬁc characteristics. The results are reported in Table 1.
For the testing of hypotheses 1 and 3, on the relationship between prior knowledge and
alliance learning, and the inﬂuence of strong and weak ties in alliances on learning, we test
our model using regression analysis. Because our dependent variable is left censored (see
Figure 1) we cannot use standard OLS regression, but instead have to use Tobit regression.
Table 2 shows the correlations for hypotheses 1 and 3. It turns out that there are no
severe correlations among our independent variables, except for R&Dij and ﬁrm size
254 W. Schoenmakers & G. Duystersmeasured as the logarithm of the number of employees (0.758), and between one of the
PAGi variables (PAG70) and both R&Dij (0.817) and SIZEij (0.710). We ran our
regressions with different combinations of these variables and it turns out to make no
difference for our results. The same applies to PAG5 and R&Dij (0.742). Some other
high correlations are among variables that were never regressed together, thus posing
no problem. The different prior alliance variables for instance are highly correlated,
which is logical, but we only use one of these variables at a time in our regressions.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the variables in hypotheses 1 and 3
Variable Mean Std dev. Min. Max.
1 KBOA5(  1000) 4.45 5.11 0 30.43
2 KBOB5(  1000) 4.36 5.44 0 26.40
3 (KBOB5)
2 ( 1000) 48.22 108.86 0 696.93
4P A Sij70 1.60 1.86 0 7
5P A Sij5 0.92 1.49 0 7
6P A Gij70 68.12 41.32 5 182.50
7P A Gij5 32.94 23.43 1 85.50
8 PEASij5 0.29 0.65 0 3
9 R&Dij 6.99 0.93 4.77 8.71
10 SIZEij 11.76 0.64 10.48 13.09
11 SECTORij 0.35 0.48 0 1
12 EQUITYij 0.24 0.43 0 1
Figure 1. Spread of the dependent variable KBOA5
Learning in Strategic Technology Alliances 255Table 2. Correlations for the variables in hypotheses 1 and 3
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 KBOA5 1.00
2 KBOB5 0.739   1.00
3 (KBOB5)
2 0.628   0.918   1.00
4P A Sij70 0.321   0.349   0.245  1.00
5P A Sij5 0.181 0.288  0.204 0.793   1.00
6P A Gij70 0.305   0.410   0.350   0.470   0.359   1.00
7P A Gij5 0.356   0.447   0.392   0.466   0.402   0.939   1.00
8 PEASij5 0.027 0.163 0.134 0.541   0.710   0.257  0.253  1.00
9 R&Dij 0.299   0.405   0.338   0.448   0.400   0.817   0.742   0.331   1.00
10 SIZEij 0.180 0.224  0.202 0.355   0.334   0.710   0.552   0.288  0.758   1.00
11 SECTORij 0.413   0.311   0.289  0.171 0.201 20.018 20.018 0.253  0.038 0.059 1.00
12 EQUITYij 20.054 20.076 20.067 0.025 20.051 0.037 20.025 20.028 20.004 0.075 20.162 1.00




























sWe also regressed every independent variable on all the other independent variables
(values not reported here). This shows no serious multicollinearity among the independent
variables. All the VIF values were well below 5 (where 10 is the standard cut-off value).
Table 3 provides the empirical results for the Tobit regression for hypotheses 1 and
3. We only show those regressions that we ran with different combinations of variables
that give extra information, more regressions were carried out but they gave no different
results. As extra control we also regressed using OLS regression. The results are in line
with the results as reported under Tobit regression. KBOBij turns out to be very signiﬁcant
every time we ran the regression and the sign is always positive. Our independent variable
(KBOBij)
2 is also signiﬁcant in every regression and this time the sign is always negative.
Put together these two variables provide strong proof for our ﬁrst hypothesis, which argues
that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the learning taking place in an alli-
ance and the prior knowledge overlap between the ﬁrms. To further test this relationship
we investigated the shape of this relationship, using the ﬁrst regression in Table 3. We
plotted the relationship between KBOB5 on the X-axes and the learning effect on the
Y-axes (see Figure 2). This gives us the gross learning effect.
On the line Y ¼ X both KBOA5 and KBOB5 have the same value and no learning is
taking place. Learning takes place for the part of our parabola that is above the Y ¼ X
line. If we thus want to know the net learning effect we need to subtract the line Y ¼ X
from our parabolic relationship. By doing this we end up with a new parabola with a
Table 3. Results of Tobit regression: hypotheses 1 and 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
KBOB5
( 1000)
5.062    5.098    4.833    5.158    5.219    4.876    5.351   




22.253   22.287   21.877  22.239   22.119   22.130   22.165  
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)






PAGij5 1.945  1.984   1.467
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
PEASij5 22.323   22.361   22.767    22.221    21.862  21.898 
(0.657) (0.671) (0.756) (0.676) (0.921) (0.660)
R&Dij 21.782  21.709  20.598
(0.143) (0.147) (0.101)
SIZEij 21.918  21.300 21.619 20.908
(0.080) (0.062) (0.087) (0.061)
SECTORij 3.972    4.052    3.722    3.831    3.577    3.562    3.474   
(0.865) (0.865) (0.823) (0.876) (0.842) (0.824) (0.834)
EQUITYij 0.364 0.410 0.214 0.260 0.366 0.360 0.220
(0.813) (0.810) (0.802) (0.818) (0.828) (0.832) (0.823)
   p , 0.01;   p , 0.05;  p , 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses.
Learning in Strategic Technology Alliances 257maximum for KBOA5 at KBOB5 ¼ 0.9 (see Figure 3). The formula of the parabola is
22.253X
2 þ 4.062X þ 52.42: the control variables are added up to give one value for
the constant. The parabola crosses the X axes at X1 ¼ –4.01 and X2 ¼ 5.81. Because
our dependent variable has a mean of 4.45 and a standard deviation of 5.11 we know
that 95% of our results are in the area of X ¼ 4.45 + (2   5.11), i.e. from X ¼ –5.77
to X ¼ 14.67. Our results are well within this range and the net learning does indeed
show an inverted U-shaped relationship, where the learning ﬁrst increases with increasing
before knowledge base overlap (KBOB5), reaches a maximum for KBOB5 ¼ 0.9 and
decreases after this point.
Hypothesis 3 is not supported by our data. We ﬁnd, on the contrary, strong evidence for
the opposite, weak ties are more important for learning than strong ties. Our variable
PEAs5 is every time signiﬁcant and negative. This thus indicates that more prior equity
alliances with the same ﬁrm leads to less learning. Our prior alliance variables all give
positive results though not always signiﬁcant. Thus the number of prior alliances has a
positive inﬂuence on the learning in strategic alliances. These two results combined,
support strong evidence that the alliances in our sample learn more from weak ties than
from strong ties. It could be that complementarity outweighs trust for the ﬁrms in our
sample.Another explanation forthis remarkable result might be that the ﬁrms are suffering
Figure 2. Gross learning effect
Figure 3. Net learning effect
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50 Embeddedness inﬂuences the ﬁrms’ allying behaviour,
51
leading to preferential allying partners, because trust is an important basis for knowledge
exchange and partner selection.
52 This would lead ﬁrms to search for allying partners
among their trusted partners with whom they have had beneﬁcial partnerships in the
past.
53 This reduces search costs and alleviates opportunistic behaviour between the part-
ners.
54 The more ﬁrms rely on these same partners, the more they are going to resemble the
partner and the less they are able to learn from it. When partners become more familiar
with each other, they start to resemble each other more.
55 The proximity between partners
reduces the divergence of the attitudes between the partners, especially for partners who
are connected via strong ties.
56 They might develop core rigidities,
57 which can cause
them to fall into competency traps.
58 Alliance ﬁrms thus get isolated from possible
alliance partners outside the current alliance partners; therefore they will suffer from
decreasing possibilities for learning and innovation.
59 The more ﬁrms work together,
the greater the trust and intimacy between them will grow.
60 Over time this may lead to
‘over-embeddedness’ where ﬁrms get too similar and this will lead to decreasing oppor-
tunities for learning and innovation.
61 Learning via strong ties is thus still beneﬁcial
and very important for the allying ﬁrms, but research suggests that there is a limit to
the positive effects observed. The stronger ﬁrms work together and especially the
longer they work together in stronger ties, the less their innovative performance and the
less they can learn from each other.
62 This outcome is in line with our ﬁndings and
serves as a good explanation for the results we are ﬁnding.
Looking further at Table 3 it turns out that also our control variable SECTORij is
signiﬁcant and positive for every regression analysis. This indicates that indeed there is
more learning taking place in an alliance between ﬁrms from the same sector, compared
to ﬁrms from different sectors.
We ﬁnd slight positive results for our control variable EQUITY (but never signiﬁcant),
this might indicate that this speciﬁc form of the alliance is important for learning. Further
research is however needed here. We also ran the regressions without this control variable
and it turned out to make no difference for our results.
For our size variable we ﬁnd only very weak evidence for our expected relationship
between size and learning, more research is needed here to draw any conclusions although
it seems that our results support the view that smaller ﬁrms are more innovative.
Almost the same goes for our variable R&D intensity, we ﬁnd slight negative results,
but they are not signiﬁcant enough to make any concrete statements about the inﬂuence
of this variable on the learning.
Totestoursecondhypothesiswe usedtwodifferent methods.Firstweusedat-test tosee
if there was a difference between the two groups, the alliance group and the control group.
Because our data is not fully normally distributed we used a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test,
Table 4. Results of t-test and Wilcoxon signed ranks test
Mean Std dev. t Sig. (2-tailed)
t-test 0.972 4.601 1.865 0.066
Z Sig. (2 tailed)
Wilcoxon signed ranks. 22.176 0.030
N ¼ 78.
Learning in Strategic Technology Alliances 259next to a normal t-test,to compare the two groups. We ﬁnd that our groups are signiﬁcantly
apartatthe 5%signiﬁcancelevel forboththe normal t-testand the Wilcoxon SignedRanks
test. The increase in learning is signiﬁcantly greater for the ﬁrms from the alliance group as
compared to the ﬁrms from the control group. The results are reported in Table 4.
As a second test for the difference we regressed the knowledge base overlap before and
after, for the two groups, the alliance group and the control group, using a dummy variable
(ALLIACon). The dummy variable is zero (0) if the ﬁrms belong to the alliance group and
one (1) if they belong to the control group. It turns out that the dummy variable is signiﬁ-
cant and negative, indicating that the ﬁrms in the alliance group learn signiﬁcantly more
than the ﬁrms in the control group (for results, see Table 5). It turns out that alliances are an
important vehicle for learning among ﬁrms.
Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we empirically investigated the effect of strategic technology partnering on
the knowledge bases of companies involved in learning alliances. The alliances we thus
research are established for the sole purpose of learning from the allying partner. From
a knowledge-based perspective we hypothesised that the degree of overlap in the
allying partners initial knowledge base is inverted U-shaped related to the degree of learn-
ing taking place in the alliance. Our empirical results indeed show that a medium degree of
knowledge overlap between alliance partners is more effective for learning from the
partner ﬁrm than a degree of knowledge overlap that is either too high or too low. This
supports the existing literature on absorptive capacity, which argues that if ﬁrms have
too little overlap in terms of their technological know-how they will be unable to
absorb the know-how of their partners. However, if ﬁrms are too similar they might
suffer from a lack of synergy in the alliance. If similar players are linked in an alliance
chances increase that the information ﬂows between partners are redundant.
63 Besides
learning there are of course many other reasons for ﬁrms to establish an alliance with
another ﬁrm. Learning might not be the most important reason for establishing an alliance,
but merely one of a multitude of reasons. Even if learning is not the prime reason but just
one of the reasons, it turns out that it is very important for managers of these companies to
understand the relationship between pre-alliance knowledge base overlap and the learning
taking place. Depending on where they are on the curve, they might be in a position to
learn, or not to learn from the allying partner. Knowing this they might want to search
from another partner with whom the learning potential is higher, or they might want to
reassess the learning potential. This conclusion holds of course even more for alliances
that have learning as their main goal.
Table 5. Regression results: hypothesis 2
Variable
KBOB5(  1000) 0.743   
(0.041)
ALLIACon 20.183   
(0.438)
   p , 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
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degrees of learning than ﬁrms not engaged in these alliances. The results from our analysis
show that alliances can be seen to have a signiﬁcant and positive effect on the learning rate
of the companies in our study. This might be surprising given the high failure rates of stra-
tegic alliances that can be found in the literature.
64 The ﬁnding is however in line with
more recent work in the area of innovation studies.
65 This body of literature shows that
learning alliances seem to be a particularly effective means of knowledge acquisition.
Our third and ﬁnal hypothesis was concerned with the differences in learning rates of
strong vs weak ties. We argued that strong ties would be more effective in transferring
technological know-how because ﬁrms are more familiar with each other and will show
higher trust levels. As a result, the chances of opportunistic behaviour between partners
are considered to be lower and therefore we expect that information will ﬂow more effec-
tively between partners. Our ﬁndings however indicate that weak ties are more effective
than strong ties. This seems to suggest that complementarity outweighs trust in alliance
relationships. Synergetic effects might be higher in weak ties than in the case of strong
ties. Furthermore, new knowledge generated in weak ties is likely to be more innovative
than knowledge that is generated in strong ties relationships. However, ﬁrms connected
via strong ties might also suffer from ‘over-embeddedness’, leading them to develop
core rigidities and decreasing the learning potential from their partner. Therefore,
the chances that knowledge exchange leads to the application of patents is likely to be
higher in weak tie relationships.
Overall, we can conclude that alliances have established themselves as an important
means of (external) knowledge acquisition but that partner selection forms a critical deter-
minant for the effectiveness of the knowledge exchange process. In this partner selection
process the knowledge overlap between the allying ﬁrms and the strength of their tie seems
to be of eminent importance.
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